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INTRODUCTION 
New York City is the financial hub of the United States and 
according to some, the world.2  Yet, New York is the only state without 
a private right of action for violations of state securities laws, and thus 
fails to provide its resident investors with the securities protection 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Adam J. Gana is the managing partner of Gana LLP.  His practice focuses on 
all aspects of securities arbitration, complex commercial and business litigation, 
insurance litigation, employment law, class actions, and appeals.  Mr. Gana was named 
in the New York Super Lawyers Rising Stars® for four straight years, ranked AV® 
Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell™ (the highest honor offered), and ranked by the 
National Trial Lawyers as one of the Top 100 attorneys in the State of New York. 
Michael Villacres is currently enrolled in New York Law School, Class of 2014, with a 
focus on Securities and Corporate Law.  Mr. Villacres graduated from Fordham 
University in 2010 with a B.A. in Political Science. 
 2. Richard Florida, What is the World’s Most Economically Powerful City?, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 8, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2012/05/what-is-the-worlds-most-economically-powerful-city/256841/. 
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afforded to residents of other states.3  Blue Sky laws are statutorily 
designed to regulate the statewide sale of securities.4  Compared to the 
Blue Sky laws of other states, New York’s Martin Act severely5 restricts 
New York residents.6 
This Article first discusses, in Part I, the origins and legislative 
history of the Martin Act in order to explain its purpose.  Next, Part II 
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the Blue Sky laws of other 
states.  In light of this exploration, Part III of this Article shows how 
New York residents are disadvantaged because they cannot rely on a 
statutory private cause of action under the act.  Finally, this Article 
recommends that to truly protect New York’s investing public, the New 
York legislature must either enact a new Blue Sky law or modify the 
Martin Act to include a private right of action. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S BLUE SKY 
LAW 
Securities regulations have become a necessity to protect the 
increasing number of investors who have become involved in the 
marketplace.7  To fund World War I, the federal government began to 
sell “securities in the form of Liberty Bonds” to the public.8  While this 
introduced many average citizens to the idea of security ownership, it 
also exposed investors to early forms of securities fraud.9  Yet, as the 
federal government had not enacted any legislation to protect its 
citizens, state legislatures were left to act on the matter.10  Thus, states 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. See Stephanie Meyers, Comment, Blue Skies Ahead:  Auto Rate Securities and 
the Need for Private Right of Action for New York Investors, 30 PACE L. REV. 1109, 
1110 (2010). 
 4. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 347, 348–49 (1991). 
 5. See Meyers, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ambrose V. McCall, Comments on the Martin Act, 3 BROOK. L. REV. 190, 191 
(1933). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 192–93.  One early type of fraud found was “switching” where a Liberty 
bond holder would be induced to give up his/her share which paid 3-4% back annually 
for a “practically worthless stock” with a promise of higher earnings. Id. 
 10. Id. at 193. 
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enacted Blue Sky laws to protect investors from dishonest vendors who 
“sell shares in the ‘bright blue sky itself.’”11 
New York faced the problem of “an enormous population with an 
unusually high per capita wealth suddenly made security conscious” that 
was prey to dishonest investment practices.12  Thus, on May 7, 1921, the 
New York legislature enacted the Martin Act to protect investors from 
the fraudulent sale of securities.13  The Martin Act empowers the New 
York State Attorney General to regulate and enforce the securities laws 
of New York.14  However, there is no express or implied private cause 
of action in the text of the Martin Act’s anti-fraud provisions.15  Very 
few sources of legislative history look into a private cause of action or 
why the legislature might have left it out.16  As such, the New York 
courts have ruled that there is no private right of action under the Martin 
Act.17 
Although there is no private cause of action in the Martin Act, an 
individual can still bring a claim under common law fraud in New York 
as long as the traditional rules of pleadings and proof are fulfilled.18  In 
Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management 
Inc., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the legislature 
intended the Martin Act to supplant “non-fraud common law claims.”19  
To override common law, there must first be a “clear and specific 
legislative intent” to do so.20  The legislature, however, did not expressly 
state that the Martin Act would eliminate all other common law claims 
that could relate to securities fraud.21  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. Id. at 190. 
 12. Id. at 193. 
 13. CHARLES MILLS, FRAUDULENT PRACTICES IN RESPECT TO SECURITIES AND 
COMMODITIES:  WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MARTIN ACT 291 (W.C. Little & Co. 
1925). 
 14. Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Natwest Finance, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2014)). 
 15. CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987). 
 16. Id. at 122. 
 17. Id. at 119. 
 18. Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., LLC, 862 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 
2008). 
 19. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 962 N.E.2d 765, 
767–69 (N.Y. 2011). 
 20. Id. (citing Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 385 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 
1978)). 
 21. Id. 
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determined that an investor may “bring a common-law claim (for fraud 
or otherwise) that is not entirely dependent on the Martin Act . . . .”22  
The court reasoned that allowing both common law fraud actions and 
actions brought by the Attorney General under the Martin Act would 
further the legislature’s goal of “combating fraud and deception in 
securities transactions.”23 
However, combating fraud in securities transactions is better met 
through simply allowing a private cause of action under the Martin 
Act.24  The other forty-nine states have enacted Blue Sky statutes with 
private rights of action that make it easier for private litigants to bring 
causes of actions to combat securities fraud.25  New York is the lone 
exception. 
II. THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF 2002 AND OTHER STATES’ BLUE 
SKY LAWS 
In 1930, the Uniform Law Commission, a non-profit 
unincorporated association,26 introduced the Uniform Sales of Securities 
Act of 1930 (“Uniform Securities Act”),27 which was later replaced by 
the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (the “1956 Act”).28  One of the main 
reasons for updating the Uniform Securities Act was to standardize state 
and federal securities laws.29  The drafters determined that unifying state 
and federal laws would streamline the legal system for protecting 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Id. at 770. 
 23. Id. at 771. 
 24. See infra Parts II and III. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 27. Securities Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Securities%20Act (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2014). 
 28. Joel Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 243 
(2003); see also UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF 1956 §§ 101, 419 (1956), available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/UniformSecuritesAct1956withcomm
ents.pdf. 
 29. Securities Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Securities%20Act. 
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investors.30  The 1956 Act served as a model for many states’ Blue Sky 
laws.31  Although the 1956 Act was updated by the Revised Uniform 
Securities Act of 1985 (“RUSA”), many states did not adopt RUSA.32  
The revised 1956 Act was most recently amended by the Uniform 
Securities Act of 2002 (the “2002 Act” and collectively, the “Uniform 
Acts”).33  Section 501 of the 2002 Act and § 101 of the 1956 Act were 
modeled after § 10b-5 of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 193434 
and § 17a35 of the federal Securities Act of 1933.36  Most states have 
adopted some version of the Uniform Acts as their Blue Sky law.37 
The advantage of following the Uniform Acts is that when there is 
ambiguity in a state’s Blue Sky law, courts may defer to cases that have 
interpreted the federal securities laws38 because each state requires that 
the substantive elements of its law are harmonious to those in the federal 
laws.39 To bring a private securities action under § 10b-5, a plaintiff 
must prove the following elements:40 “(1) a material misrepresentation 
or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and 
(6) loss causation.”41 
However, the states do not require “exact parallelism with other 
states’ and federal law.”42  For example, Minnesota’s Blue Sky Law, 
which is based on the 2002 Act, does not require scienter and allows for 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. 
Securities Regulatory Framework:  A Lesson from Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 
10 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 470–71 (2006). 
 31. Id. at 427. 
 32. See Seligman, supra note 28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012). 
 36. Merry v. Prestige Capital Mkts., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709 (D. Minn. 
2013). 
 37. Nichols, supra note 30. 
 38. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 39. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1049 (Wash. 
1987), amended, 750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988). 
 40. See Seligman, supra note 28; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191–92 (2013) 
 41. Id. at 1192. 
 42. Haberman, 744 P.2d at 1049. 
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negligent misrepresentations as a cause of action unlike the federal 
laws.43  Similarly, Missouri’s Blue Sky law, also based on the 2002 Act, 
does not require scienter to prove securities fraud.44  These states allow 
investors who would otherwise be unable to bring a cause of action 
under federal law to bring a state law claim.45 
While most states have adopted some version of the Uniform Acts, 
other states, such as California, Florida, and Texas, have created 
divergent Blue Sky laws.46  The California Corporate Securities Law of 
1969 (“CCS”) enables investors to establish a securities violation and 
recover damages more easily than under the Uniform Acts and 10b-5.47  
If not for the CCS, investors in California would not be able to bring 
certain causes of action because of the heightened pleading standards of 
common law and federal law.48  Under the CCS, privity is required to 
prove negligent conduct on the part of the seller but not to prove market 
manipulation.49  Additionally, the CCS does not require the plaintiff to 
prove reliance or scienter.50  However, even though reliance and scienter 
are not necessary to bring the action, the statute is not strict liability 
because the defendant may defend himself by: 
(1) prov[ing] that he exercised reasonable care and did not know of 
the untruth or omission, (2) show[ing] that even if he had exercised 
                                                                                                                                         
 43. See Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of the City of Brainerd, 
821 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 2012); see also Merry v. Prestige Capital Mkts., Ltd., 944 
F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Minn. 2013) (“At the pleading stage, a plaintiff asserting liability 
under Minn. Stat. § 80A.68(2) must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission 
by the defendant; (2) negligence; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or 
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation 
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”). 
 44. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1109, 1130. 
 45. Compare MINN. STAT. § 80A.68(2) (2014), and MINN. STAT. § 80A.40 (2014), 
with Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012), and Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 46. See California Corporate Securities Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25000 (2014); 
Florida Securities Investor Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 517 (2014); Texas Securities 
Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (West 2014). 
 47. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876 (Ct. App.  1977). 
 48. See California Corporate Securities Law of 1969, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 
(2014); see also Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 876–78. 
 49. California Amplifier, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 921 (Ct. App. 
2001).  When there is evidence of market manipulation privity is not required, but it is 
limited to intentional misrepresentations. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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reasonable care, he would not have known of the untruth or 
omission, and (3) show[ing] that the plaintiff knew the facts 
concerning the untruth or omission.51 
Although the CCS makes it easier for a plaintiff to bring an action, 
the California legislature did put in some restrictions.52  One restriction 
is monetary: the plaintiff may not recover punitive damages even if the 
plaintiff would be able to do so under California common law.53  A 
second restriction is the strict statute of limitations of four years after the 
violation or one year after the plaintiff realized that there was a 
violation, whichever shall expire first.54  The purpose of this limitation is 
to prevent the alleged victim from having more time to speculate “at the 
expense of innocent parties.”55 
Florida’s Blue Sky law is known as the Florida Securities Investor 
Protection Act (“FSIPA”).56  The FSIPA, which was once interpreted to 
be similar to § 10b-5 because they use similar language, was eventually 
distinguished from § 10b-5.57  In Rouseff, the Florida Supreme Court 
addressed whether proximate cause was an element of the FSIPA.58  The 
court found that FSIPA, which allows that the “scienter requirement . . . 
is satisfied by a showing of mere negligence” rather than reckless 
disregard, was more analogous to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act.59  Therefore, 
this ruling makes it easier for an individual to bring a cause of action 
under the FSIPA than under the federal securities laws. 
However, like with federal law, a privity requirement must be 
fulfilled.60  Unlike § 10b-5, which covers “any person” involved in the 
deceitful purchase or sale of a security, the FSIPA is “far more 
restrictive” because it applies to a narrower group of activities where 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
 52. See Boam v. Trident Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 180 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 53. Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Michael A. Hanzman, Civil Remedies Under the Florida Securities and 
Investor Protection Act, 64 FLA. BAR J. 36 (1990), available at 
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Articles/E2981A6F0E0E3B9385
256B1B004C54DF. 
 57. Id. 
 58. E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d  978 (Fla. 1989). 
 59. In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 1168, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
 60. Id. (citing Rousseff, 537 So. 2d at 981). 
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“buyer/seller privity is required.”61  Once privity is shown to exist 
between the parties, the FSIPA imposes a standard of “mere negligence” 
to bring a cause of action. 
The privity element can be detrimental to a plaintiff’s action against 
a third party if the plaintiff cannot show privity with that third party.  
For instance, in In re Checkers Securities Litigation, the court found 
privity and involvement between the seller and buyer but not between 
the sellers and the sellers’ auditor KPMG.62  Under the FSIPA, auditors 
cannot be held liable when they merely provided “professional services 
and had no financial interest in the sale of the securities.”63  Therefore, 
because these two elements were not present, KPMG was not liable.64 
The FSIPA also includes an attorney fee-shifting provision that 
further distinguishes it from federal law and other state statutes.65  A fee-
shifting provision requires the losing party to bear the reasonable 
attorney’s fees of the other side.66  The FSIPA fee-shifting provision 
states: 
[t]he court shall grant reasonable compensation for services rendered 
and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses incurred . . . by a 
trustee, and by the attorney for such trustee, in connection with a 
liquidation proceeding.67 
Fee-shifting provisions can be a blessing and a curse for investors.  
Such provisions encourage investors to bring only the most meritorious 
cases and discourage investors from bringing cases that are not clear 
winners.68  Fee-shifting provisions also change the dynamic of 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. Hanzman, supra note 56. 
 62. In re Checkers, 858 F. Supp. at 1180. 
 63. Id. (citing Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 535–37 (9th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 64. See id. at 1180–81. 
 65. HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: AWARDS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 75 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf. 
 66. Thomas D. Rowe Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting:  A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982). 
 67. COHEN, supra note 65 (quoting Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
78eee(b)(5)(A) (2012)). 
 68. Rowe, supra note 66, at 652. 
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settlement negotiations69 by encouraging parties to negotiate earlier and 
more often. 
Texas’s Blue Sky law, the Texas Securities Act (“TSA”), is also 
unique.70  The main purpose of the TSA is to “facilitate investors’ 
actions to recover their monies through a simplified fraud action . . . .”71  
Like the CCS and FSIPA, the TSA provides investors with an 
alternative route to bring causes of actions that differ from common or 
federal law.72  Unlike Texas’s common law fraud claims, the TSA does 
not require privity or scienter.73  In addition, the TSA requires neither 
reliance on the seller’s material misrepresentation or omission nor any 
due diligence on the part of the buyer.74  Like the CCS, when parts of 
the TSA are found to be similar to federal law, Texas courts may turn to 
cases that interpret federal law for guidance on novel issues, but do not 
necessarily find such federal law interpretations dispositive.75 
However, unlike the CCS and the FSIPA, the TSA requires 
heightened pleading for claims against aiders and abettors of securities 
fraud.76  To establish liability against an aider and abettor of securities 
fraud, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) the existence of a primary violation of the securities laws, (2) that 
the aider has a general awareness of its role in the violation, (3) that 
the aider gave substantial assistance in the violation, and (4) that the 
aider intended to deceive the plaintiff or acted with reckless 
disregard for the truth of the representations made by the primary 
violator.77 
This pleading standard is higher than where the plaintiff asserts 
liability against the person directly responsible for the fraud.  For 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. Nicholas N. Nierengarten, Fee Shifting:  The Recovery of In-House Legal Fees, 
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 229 (2012). 
 70. See Keith Rowley, The Sky Is Still Blue in Texas:  State Law Alternatives to 
Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 104 (1998). 
 71. George Lee Flint Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1119 
(2008). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Granader v. McBee, 23 F.3d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 75. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 567 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 76. See id. at 568 (citing Frank v. Bear, Stearns, & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 
App. 2000)). 
 77. Id. 
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instance, the Texas Appellate Court held that where lawyers merely 
prepare the transactional documents for the perpetrator of the fraud 
without the requisite scienter, there is no aiding and abetting liability.78 
Still, whether modeled on the Uniform Acts or not, all of the Blue 
Sky laws of the forty-nine states share the goal of aiding investor 
protection.79  To achieve this, all states but New York recognize a 
private cause of action for securities fraud in violation of their respective 
Blue Sky laws.80  If the New York legislature truly seeks to protect 
investors, as it did when it created the Martin Act,81 then it must modify 
its law to include a private right of action for Martin Act violations. 
III. CHALLENGES FACING NEW YORK INVESTORS 
A New York investor can raise a private cause of action only 
through common law fraud, as opposed to state statutory violations.  
The elements for common law fraud in New York are: “1) 
[r]epresentations, 2) [f]alsity, 3) [s]cienter . . .; 4) [d]eception of the 
party to whom made; and 5) [i]njury due to justified reliance on the 
misrepresentation.”82  However, the Attorney General “need not allege 
or prove either scienter or intentional fraud” to bring a civil enforcement 
proceeding under the Martin Act.83  This advantage is exclusively given 
to the New York Attorney General.84 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 79. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 735 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Because the entire purpose of “blue sky” laws is to protect investors, the law must be 
liberally construed to carry out that plain legislative intent.”); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 
v. Hudson, 226 P.2d 501, 504 (Or. 1951) (“The Blue Sky Law was enacted for the 
protection of the public[.]”); Hanzman, supra note 56 (“[E]ngrafting a scienter or 
reliance element onto §517.211 would, in the author’s opinion, run counter to . . . the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that the act be given a broad and liberal interpretation to 
effectuate its purpose of protecting the public . . . .”). 
 80. See CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987) (“In 
all the other States, except one, the Legislature has expressly recognized a private civil 
action for violations of the corresponding provision. Under the Martin Act, however, no 
private action has been expressly authorized.”). 
 81. McCall, supra note 7, at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1126. 
 83. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 962 N.E.2d 765, 768 
(N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1124. 
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When compared to the Blue Sky laws of other states, like Florida, 
where “mere negligence” is sufficient to state a cause of action, New 
Yorkers are clearly at a disadvantage.85  The most glaring disadvantage 
for investors in bringing claims under New York’s common law fraud is 
that they cannot easily bring claims for fraudulent omissions.  New York 
plaintiffs must show that “the defendant knowingly uttered a falsehood 
intending to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit and that the plaintiff was 
thereby deceived and damaged.”86  Omission claims may be preempted 
if the plaintiff shows “active concealment unrelated to omissions from 
Martin Act disclosures.”87  Under the CCS or FSIPA, New Yorkers 
could more easily plead claims of omissions.  For example, in Ashland 
Inc., a federal New York case, the defendant, Morgan Stanley, was 
accused of making false and misleading statements and material 
omissions to get Ashland Inc. to purchase student loan auction rate 
securities (“ARSs”).88  Morgan Stanley allegedly urged Ashland to 
continue purchasing ARSs even though Morgan Stanley knew that the 
market for those securities was collapsing.89  However, the court found 
that Ashland failed to state a claim of fraud under New York common 
law due to insufficient pleadings of scienter and reliance.90  Had this 
case been brought in California or Florida, though, Ashland would have 
been better able to plead its case because in those states: (1) the pleading 
standards are lower; (2) an omission can be the basis for a claim of 
fraud; and (3) reliance is not a necessary element to plead securities 
fraud.91  Thus, while the Martin Act was a novel initiative when it was 
                                                                                                                                         
 85. In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 1168, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (“The . . . 
scienter requirement under Florida law is satisfied by a showing of mere negligence, 
whereas the minimum showing under Rule 10b–5 is reckless disregard.”).  Cf. Meyers, 
supra note 3, at 1126. 
 86. Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 151 N.E.2d 833, 835 
(N.Y. 1958). 
 87. Kerusa Co. v. W107/515 Real Estate P’ship, 12 N.Y.3d 236, 246 (2009). 
 88. Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 700 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d, 652 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 471–72. 
 91. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 580 (Cal. 1993) (“There is no requirement 
under these sections that the plaintiff rely upon the statements or acts of the defendant 
or even that he be aware that the defendant made them or engaged in them. All that is 
required is that the plaintiff establish that the price which he paid or received was 
affected by the defendant’s conduct or statements, which would of course assume that 
someone acted on the basis of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. However, it is not 
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first introduced, it has since become outdated and limits New York 
investors in seeking remedies for securities fraud. 
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
As the current state of the Martin Act fails to adequately protect 
investors in New York, the New York legislature should adopt a new 
security law similar to the Blue Sky laws in California or Florida.92  A 
law based on the Uniform Acts, thought to be superior to the Martin 
Act, might be disadvantageous because as stated earlier, any ambiguity 
found in the statute may lead the courts to defer to the higher standard of 
federal law.93  At the very least, the legislature should amend the Martin 
Act to include a private right of action so that defrauded investors could 
more easily recover for their wrongful losses.94  There appears to be no 
legitimate reason for investors in New York to continue being 
disadvantaged compared to those in the rest of the United States.  The 
only reason that the courts give for this discrepancy is that a private 
right of action is inconsistent with “the legislative scheme underlying 
the Martin Act.”95 If anything, given that New York is the center of the 
securities industry,96 investors in New York should have greater 
protection from fraudulent practices in the industry because of the 
increased likelihood of such fraud to occur.97  It is time for the New 
York legislature to further its Blue Sky law for the benefit of its 
residents. 
                                                                                                                                         
necessary that the plaintiff prove that he personally was influenced by such conduct.”) 
(citing 1 MARSH & VOLK, Practice Under the Cal. Securities Law  § 14.05[6], at 14–53 
(1993) (footnote omitted)); see also, People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1281 (Cal. 1995) 
(“[T]he California Legislature intended section 25401 to apply to any willful conduct 
and did not make knowledge of the falsity of a statement an element of the offense.”). 
 92. See infra Part III. 
 93. See infra Part II. 
 94. See Meyers, supra note 3. 
 95. CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987). 
 96. See Florida, supra note 2. 
 97. See McCall, supra note 7. 
